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COST LIMITS IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
LOLA DICKERMAN *
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the cost limitation
provisions in cost-type Government contracts. The standard inclusion
of such clauses as contract "boiler-plate" has resulted in a folk-lore
as to their meaning and significance which often clouds the contract.
This paper will consider the following specific problems:
1. To what fee is the contractor entitled when the monies on
the contract have been expended and the Government does
not provide additional funds?
2. What obligation is there on the Government to provide funds
to cover a Contractor's overrun of costs?
3. Who has title to the property generated by the overrun costs?
4. What is the interaction between the termination article and
the cost limitation articles?
The crux of these problems is the inherently special nature of
a cost-type contract; as in most such contracts, the Contractor agrees
to fulfill the work statement although neither party is prepared to say
what the total undertaking will cost.
In the case of fixed-price Government contracts the contract
recites the total compensation to be paid.' The fee in cost reimburse-
ment contracts is similarly recited in a total fixed amount? The
peculiar obligation undertaken by the Government to pay all allowable
costs of performance in cost-type or "CPFF" contracts gives rise to
the need for a limit on the amount which the Contractor may spend
on the Government's account.
It is well settled that no Government contract may be made unless
it is done pursuant to an appropriation adequate to its fulfillment. 3
The Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1955, 4 which treats of the re-
cording and reporting of obligated funds, provides that no amount shall
be recorded as an obligation of the Government of the United States
unless it is supported by documentary evidence of a binding agreement
in writing.
* Graduate, Boston University Law School, 1947; admitted to practice before
Massachusetts and Federal bars and the Court of Claims; member, National Panel of
Arbitration, American Arbitration Association; presently in private practice in Boston,
Mass., devoted entirely to the field of government contracts.
1 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7.103-7 (1958).
2 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7.203-4 (1959).
3 34 Stat. 255 (1906), 41 U.S.C. § 11 (1959).
4 68 Stat. 813 (1954), 31 U.S.C. § 200(a) (1) (1959).
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The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) has
said of CPFF contracts that as a
general proposition the estimated cost is on the work required
by the contract and that any work not included in the esti-
mated cost is not included in the contract, although the accu-
racy of the estimated cost is not guaranteed . . . .5
In order, then, that the monetary obligation of the Government
shall be so limited in accordance with the law, there is included in
every CPFF supply contract, a clause known as "Limitation of Cost."
THE LIMITATION OF COST CLAUSE
The clause currently in use is set forth in the Armed Services
Procurement Regulations (ASPR) at Section 7.203-3.
"LIMITATION OF COST" (OCT. 1953)°
(a) It is estimated that the total cost to the Govern-
ment, exclusive of any fixed fee, for the performance of this
contract will not exceed the estimated cost set forth in the
Schedule, and the Contractor agrees to use its best efforts
to perform the work specified in the Schedule and all obliga-
tions under this contract within such estimated cost. If at any
time the Contractor has reason to believe that the costs which
it expects to incur in the performance of this contract in the
next succeeding thirty (30) days, when added to all costs
previously incurred, will exceed eighty-five percent (85%)
of the estimated cost then set forth in the Schedule, or if at
any time, the Contractor has reason to believe that the total
cost to the Government, exclusive of any fixed fee, for the
performance of this contract will be substantially greater or
less than the then estimated cost thereof, the Contractor shall
notify the Contracting Officer in writing to that effect, giving
its revised estimate of such total cost for the performance of
this contract.
(b) The Government shall not be obligated to reim-
burse the Contractor for costs incurred in excess of the esti-
mated cost set forth in the Schedule, and the Contractor shall
not be obligated to continue performance under the contract
or to incur costs in excess of the estimated cost set forth in the
Schedule, unless and until the Contracting Officer shall have
notified the Contractor in writing that such estimated cost has
been increased and shall have specified in such notice a
5 H. K. Ferguson Co., ASBCA No. 2826, 57-IBCA ¶ 1293 (1957).
6
 Other versions of the clause are found in ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7.402-2 (1959).
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revised estimated cost which shall thereupon constitute the
estimated cost of performance of this contract When and to
the extent that the estimated cost set forth in the Schedule
has been increased, any costs incurred by the Contractor in
excess of such estimated cost prior to the increase in estimated
cost shall be allowable to the same extent as if such costs had
been incurred after such increase in estimated cost.
THE NOTICE
The aforementioned clause places a duty on the Contractor
to notify the Government when he has "reason to believe" he has
reached the named 85% position. Neither party is, however, under
obligation to the other for performance or payment when the "esti-
mated cost" is expended. Lack of such notice was the issue in PRD
Electronics, Inc.' The overrun included overhead, which appellant
argued could not be determined with any degree of accuracy until
the rate was negotiated at the end of the year. The appellant said
further that the overhead factor made it impossible to determine where
he stood with respect to the ceiling cost under the clause for notice
purposes. The ASBCA found for the Government, pointing out that,
as a matter of prudent business, the Contractor must or should have
known what his actual situation was costwise at all times during per-
formance.
Some Government personnel are interpreting this statement quite
literally, and PRD Electronics has quietly become support for the
proposition that any overhead overrun, however innocently incurred,
will be barred by a lack of timely notice. This writer feels, however,
that such result was not intended by the PRD decision. The decision
would be a shocking one indeed if it obliges a Contractor to know his
overhead costs precisely on a day to day basis. The idea that the Con-
tractor can be required to give notice of that which he truly does
not know through no negligence of his own is hardly a familiar one
either in the law generally, or in this particular field.
In 1956 the Comptroller General said of a subcontractor:
However in connection with the responsibility to keep
its costs from exceeding the actual cost limitation pending
any negotiation for an increase in the amount of such limita-
tion, the subcontractor could not reasonably have been ex-
pected to know precisely what its overhead costs were at any
time during the course of performing the subcontract. Accord-
ingly, the Comptroller approved the funding of the overrun.'
7
 ASBCA No. 7713, 1962 BCA 3282 (1962).
8 Comp. Gen. Dec. No. 3-127863 (June, 1956).
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Also important on the notice issue is the recent decision in
Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co? In this case, the Board points out that al-
though the Limitation of Cost clause requires the prime Contractor to
notify the Government if his costs, including those of his subcon-
tractors, are likely to exceed the cost limitation, no requirement for no-
tice of a subcontractor's overrun exists.
The Emerson case is also illustrative of another doctrine which
has grown up around the "Limitation of Cost" clause, the so-called
"waiver" doctrine.
WAIVERS AND EXCEPTIONS TO THE CLAUSE
The "Limitation of Cost" clause is most often employed as a de-
fense to a Contractor's request for overrun reimbursement. Since
CPFF contracts do not contain a contract price as such, the amount
which will ultimately be paid the Contractor for performance of the
contract is not immutable. Obviously, if performance costs him less
than the sums allotted, his allowable costs plus his fee will constitute
the "price" (absent an incentive fee provision), and the "Limitation
of Cost" clause will never be invoked.
Costs of performance are often underestimated, however, and
Contractors will often incur costs in excess of the estimated cost set
forth in the schedule. This occurs for a variety of reasons. Sometimes,
a Contractor's bookkeeping is a week or more behind his expendi-
tures; on other occasions, the Contractor merely incurs overruns in
the hopeful expectation that he will be "covered" later.
The language of the ASBCA in the appeal of American Hydro-
math Corp." typifies the result in these cases:
Since the costs presently claimed are beyond any esti-
mate of cost specified in the contract, and since no additional
obligation to pay can be implied against the Government in
the face of the express condition setting a limit to the Govern-
ment's obligation, the Government never became and is not
now obligated to pay those costs under the terms of the con-
tract.
This case has often been cited for the proposition quoted, and it is
clear that in the absence of unusual and compelling circumstances,
Contractors will not recover unauthorized cost overruns.
A recent affirmation of this principle forms a portion of the
Board's decision in General Eke. Co.," in which a ceiling provision
incorporated into the contract barred recovery of overrun expenses.
9 ASBCA No. 8788, 1964 BCA If 4070 (1964).
10 ASBCA No. 4505, 59-2 BCA ¶ 2465 (1959).
11 ASBCA No. 5897, 61-1 BCA 3038 (1961).
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This decision illustrates the reasoning process employed in determining
whether the "Limitation of Cost" clause will or will not prevent re-
covery of overrun costs:
The Board has held that (the "Limitation of Cost"
clause) is a bar to the Contractor's recovering overrun ex-
penses where the Contractor could unquestionably have ex-
ercised the right to discontinue incurring expenses in excess
of the maximum amount set forth.
The above language originally appeared in Thiokol Chem. Corp.,' 2
and was cited later in the General Elec. Co. decision for the follow-
ing converse proposition:
This Board has held the Government liable for overrun
expenses where action by the Government caused or induced
the Contractor's continued expenditures beyond the maxi-
mum specified in the contract.' ,
The question appears to boil down to one of free and intelligent
choice. That is, a Contractor cannot recover when he could, as quoted
above, "unquestionably have exercised the right to discontinue incur-
ring expenses" over and above the estimated cost set forth in the
Schedule, but can and will recover when compelled or induced by the
Government to exceed this maximum, i.e., where the efficient cause of
the overrun is some Government action.
Apparently, Contractors will be given the benefit of a retroactive
interpretation of the conduct of the parties, provided that the Con-
tractor's conduct and reliance were reasonable.
On the one hand, we have the situation in which the Government
makes absolutely no representation, express or implied, that more
funds will be allotted to the contract and where the only reasonable
interpretation is that the Contractor, knowingly and deliberately, or
negligently, proceeded at his own risk with merely a hope, not amount-
ing to reasonable expectation, of reimbursement.
On the other hand, we have the situation which prevailed in
Thiokol, where the Contractor was virtually impelled to continue per-
formance despite exhaustion of funds and where "it is uncontroverted
that the Government here would never have permitted appellant to
discontinue performance of the contract."'
The Thiokol case involved a "crash" program for rocket engines.
Manufacture and delivery of the engines was of paramount importance
and the Contractor was spurred on to complete performance despite the
12 ASBCA No. 5726, 60-2 BCA ¶ 2852 (1960).
13 General Eke. Co., supra note 11.
14 Thiokol Chem. Corp., supra note 12.
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overrun situation, but reimbursement was later denied under the "Limi-
tation of Cost" clause of the contract.
The Board there held that the literal language of the clause must
be deemed a mere shadow of formality in the situation which obtained
with respect to that contract. It said:
Here the Government foreclosed appellant from the
right to discontinue performance at any time prior to com-
pletion of work, but nevertheless now insists that the Govern-
ment's own obligation to pay costs incurred by reason of
uninterrupted performance, remains fixed and unchanged.
To analogize, the Government cannot apply the whip and
yank back on the bridle at the same time. Having insisted
that appellant achieve sustained performance until delivery
was made, the Government must pay the overrun costs in-
curred by reason of such insistence.
In the in-between "gray" area are the so-called inducements to
continue performance, upon the promise, express or implied, that ad-
ditional funds would be forthcoming, following requests or exhorta-
tions by Government personnel not to quit. The writer is inclined to
believe that any such inducement, uttered by a Contracting Officer,
upon which the Contractor relies, should support recovery of over-
run expenses.
There is a time in these borderline situations during which the
Contractor can make his decision to discontinue performance or con-
tinue at his own risk. Any conduct, by deeds or words, of the Contract-
ing Officer which effectively motivates the Contractor to continue
performance, or which can be reasonably construed as calculated to
produce this effect, should support recovery of overrun costs. Even
the most prudent Contractors may not then be in a good business posi-
tion to "unquestionably" and unhesitatingly discontinue performance.
In these cases, the Government should be prevented by its conduct
from setting up the "Limitation of Cost" clause as a shield. Experience
tells us that Contractors place great reliance on the words of the Con-
tracting Officer. This word ought to be the Government's bond.
In Acme Precision Prods., Inc.," the Army Panel of the Board
summed up the problem as follows:
There is no evidence that appellant was asked to con-
tinue performance by any Government representative who
knew or had reason to know that contract funds were ex-
hausted. A different case would be presented if a Government
official acting within the scope of his authority had asked the
is ASBCA No. 6824, 61-1 BCA fi 3051 (1961).
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Contractor to continue performance after being informed that
the Contractor had incurred costs up to the ceiling specified
in the contract.
Other cases in this area merit our attention. In Ryan Aeronautical
Co.," the "Limitation of Cost" clause invoked by the Government was
countered by the fact that a change had been ordered, and under the
"Changes" clause the Contractor was required to proceed with the
changed work as ordered by the Government. The Contractor argued
that "Limitation of Cost" clauses did not apply to costs in excess of
the funds allotted, which costs were incurred in carrying out a change.
The Board held that both interpretations were arguable, and thus an
ambiguity resulted which was resolved by the conduct of the parties.
Since the Government continued to exact performance and appellant
continued to perform under the change long after the estimated costs
set forth in the Schedule had been exceeded, the Contractor's appeal
was sustained.
The Board also pointed out:
This holding, even without the conduct of the parties,
is in harmony with what we believe to be the consistent ruling
of the Board that a fixed ceiling in a contract containing a
price revision article has no application to a change which in-
creases the costs under the contract.
In Republic Aviation Corp.," the decision in favor of the Con-
tractor hinged on the requirement in the "Limitation of Cost" clause
that, upon making an increase, the Contracting Officer notify the Con-
tractor in writing. The Board held that the clause does not require the
writing to be in any particular form and found that the following
writings sufficed to support overrun recovery. First, a supplemental
agreement had been sent to the Contractor increasing the contract
price. The Contractor had signed and returned it, but it had never
been executed by the Government and thus did not become part of
the contract. Second, the Government had sent the Contractor a let-
ter stating that a second supplemental agreement increasing the con-
tract price would be issued. In fact, it never was.
The Board regarded the two documents as notice and assurance
to the Contractor that the contract funds would be increased, partic-
ularly since the Government was informed at a contemporaneous
conference that appellant was performing with his own funds and ob-
viously understood that it would continue to perform.
In the Emerson's case the Board speaks of cases wherein the
16 ASBCA No. 6244, 61-1 BCA ¶ 2911 (1961).
17 ASBCA No. 5729, 61-1 BCA ff 2950 (1961).
18 Emerson Elec Mfg. Co., supra note 9.
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Government had "constructively directed" a Contractor to proceed in
spite of the cost limitation and then accepted delivery of the items
produced. In the case of Consolidated Electrodynamics Corp.," the
Contractor had been led to believe that his request for funds was being
processed. That case was likened by the Board to Clevite Ordnance,
Division of Clevite Corp.,' where the parties had engaged in a long
course of conduct in which overruns were funded after the fact.
To summarize, we have seen that the "Limitation of Cost" clause
was designed to protect the Government against over-expenditure of
appropriated funds, and that it will be invoked to prevent Contractors
from recovering unauthorized cost overruns in the usual case. The
principles of the clause are not inviolable, but are considered to be a
"mere shadow of formality" in cases where the effective cause of the
overrun was some action or inducement by the Government. Con-
tractors must, however, beware of making value judgments in this area.
The very fact that a Contractor, who finds himself in a potential over-
run situation, weighs the language of the clause against the induce-
ment offered betrays his awareness of the ramifications of his situation.
Being thus able to make an intelligent decision before expenditure of
funds in excess of the sums allotted to his contract, he is "unquestion-
ably" in a position to cease performance; he cannot then place reliance
on the inducement, and the Board will doubtless so hold.
Only those Contractors who believe, in utmost good faith, that
they are proceeding under a firm reimbursement-supporting commit-
ment can ever hope to recover overrun costs in the face of the "Limi-
tation of Cost" clause. Too many Government Contractors have dis-
covered too late the potentially disastrous effect of failure to heed that
well-known but anonymous advice—"Get it in writing!"
INTERIM FUNDING CLAUSES
In some situations, the Services find that the total funds estimated
to perform the contract are not available. As a result, they have de-
veloped time-phased or interim funding arrangements. Examples of
the clauses used to limit the Contractor to the available funds are those
set forth in the Air Force Procurement Instructions at Section 7-4054.
These clauses limit the Government's obligation to reimburse the Con-
tractor to the amount which has been allotted to the contract; i.e., an
amount less than the estimated cost. The most significant feature of
interim funding clauses is that the dollar limit includes the amount
which will be payable not only for the Contractor's costs, but also, in
the event of termination, the amount which will be payable in respect
19 ASBCA No. 6732, 1963 BCA 3806 (1963).
zo ASBCA No. 5859, 1962 BCA ir 3330 (1962).
46
COST LIMITS IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS
to subcontracts, termination settlement costs, and fee. Thus the Con-
tractor who may be terminated at any time must, each day, on a
continuing basis, know what it will cost to perform or to be terminated,
and must provide appropriate notice to the Government based on this
knowledge.
It is interesting that the Air Force interim funding clauses spe-
cifically provide that if the Government does not provide additional
monies when they are needed, the Contracting Officer will terminate
the contract under the termination provisions.
Since the termination provisions relate fee earned to percentage
of completion, it is plain that the Government, under these clauses,
will pay the agreed fixed fee only in the case of complete performance.
The Government, by its decision not to fund the contract to the es-
timated amount, is now in a position to reduce the Contractor's profit.
It is clearly in the public interest that the Government have the
right to terminate contracts for military items. Contractors for the
defense establishment have always taken the risk that if the items
being produced were no longer wanted, they would be paid a profit only
for the work accomplished. By interim funding clauses, this risk is now
enlarged to include loss of fee in the situation where the Government
in its budget machinations cannot or does not choose to obligate the
money originally known to be required.
FAILURE TO INCREASE ESTIMATE OF COSTS—
"LIMITATION OF COST" ARTICLE
Unlike the interim funding clauses referred to in the last section,
the "Limitation of Cost" article does not provide that a failure to in-
crease the estimated costs shall be a termination for the convenience
of the Government.
The "Limitation of Cost" clause limits the Contractor's obliga-
tion to perform and incur costs to the limit of the monies available in
the contract. To avoid the abortion of a procurement for which funds
are obtainable, the "Limitation of Cost" clause creates a unilateral
option in the Government by which it may increase the estimated cost.
It is generally understood that if the fee, which is computed
initially as a percentage of estimated costs, were to increase com-
mensurately with the increase in estimated costs, the statutory prohibi-
tion against cost plus percentage of costs contracts would then be
violated.2 ' The "Limitation of Cost" clause is silent on the matter of
fee in this situation, but it is accepted practice that Contractors will
not be entitled to fee increases when additional sums are allotted to
'21 72 Stat. 1457 (1958), 10 U.S.C. § 2306 (1959).
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the contract. This view presumes that a CPFF Contractor's under-
taking is to complete the work.
The "Limitation of Cost" clause permits the Contractor to stop
work when funds have been exhausted, unless the Government ex-
ercises its option to provide additional funds. In cases where the sums
allotted have been expended and the Government decides not to pro-
vide additional funds, it generally invokes the machinery of the "Ter-
minations" clause of the contract, on the theory that the Contractor
has not completed performance. Under the termination procedure, the
Contractor is paid a percentage of the fee equivalent to the percentage
of completion of the work contemplated by the contract.'
It is therefore important to determine what work was contem-
plated by the contract. We must examine not only the physical work
described in the work statement, which is often immutable, but more
important, we must look to the contract to discover what it is exactly
that the Contractor has agreed to do.
Generally, the Contractor's commitment with respect to the work
called for under the contract is unequivocal. That is, for the fee, he
commits himself to perform the contract work by the contract due
date. The effect of the "Limitation of Cost" clause on the obligation
is that if the Contractor has used his best efforts to perform \within the
estimated cost but has nevertheless failed to complete performance for
this sum, he will not be amenable to default action. In effect, he has
completed his performance and discharged his obligation to work.
However, if the Government exercises its option to fund, he must con-
tinue in accordance with his agreement.
In order that we may determine what the Contractor's fee should
be when the funds are depleted and no further monies are forthcom-
ing, we should pause to examine two types of cost contracts, the un-
equivocal obligation and the obligation which is limited as to time.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN TERM-TYPE COST CONTRACTS
AND NON TERM-TYPE COST CONTRACTS
Sometimes the parties contemplate that the work may not be
capable of performance. This is particularly true in research contracts,
where the undertaking is a venture into the unknown. In these situa-
tions it is proper for the contract to provide that the Contractor shall
use his best efforts to accomplish the result being sought during a
limited period of time. This type of contract often contains an expira-
tion date, at which point the Contractor will have earned the entire fee,
provided that he has applied his best efforts to the task.
While the option granted by the "Limitation of Cost" clause to
22 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. 8.702(e) (1)(D) (I) (1959).
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provide additional funds has the same effect in both unequivocal and
term-type contracts before expiration of the contemplated time for
performance, there is a marked distinction in treatment once the due
date or expiration date is reached. In the former type of contract, a
default situation exists, absent excusable delays; whereas in the latter,
the Contractor has fully performed and is entitled to the full amount
of the fee.
Should a contract of the unequivocal type be terminated for de-
fault, a fee is paid only with respect to supplies delivered and accepted.
The Contractor is obliged to continue performance beyond the delivery
date if the Government does not terminate. If the Government desires
to continue performance toward the goal after the expiration date in
a term-type contract, it must provide additional fee as well as costs.
DETERMINATION OF FEE WHEN GOVERNMENT DOES
NOT FUND OVERRUN
If the Contractor cannot complete the work under the contract
within the estimated cost and the Government elects not to provide
additional funds, the question arises as to the amount of fixed fee to
which the Contractor is entitled. In the infrequent case where the Air
Force "Limitation of Government's Obligation" clause is applicable,
this matter is explicitly covered by the language of the clause—the fee
paid is based upon the percentage of completion of the work. If that
clause is not applicable, however, this question is not so easy to decide.
The "Limitation of Cost" clause does not contain language cover-
ing the payment of fee. It is therefore of no use in deciding the amount
of fee to be paid in this situation. Another clause specified for use in
all cost plus fixed fee contracts, "Allowable Cost, Fixed Fee, and
Payment," does contain the following language covering fee:
(a) For the performance of this contract, the Government
shall pay to the Contractor-
(i) the cost thereof .
(ii) such fixed fee, if any, as may be provided for in
the Schedule.'
The clause goes on to state procedures to be followed including the
requirement that a portion of the fixed fee be withheld, and then con-
tinues:
(e) On receipt and approval of the invoice or voucher des-
ignated by the Contractor as the "completion invoice" or
23 ASPR, 32 C.P.A. 7-203.4 (1959).
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"completion voucher" and upon compliance by the Con-
tractor with all of the provisions of this contract . . . the
Government shall promptly pay to the Contractor any bal-
ance of allowable cost, and any part of the fixed fee, which
has been withheld pursuant to (c) above or otherwise not
paid to the Contractor. The completion invoice or voucher
shall be submitted by the Contractor promptly following
completion of the work under this contract but in no event
later than one (1) year . . . from the date of such com-
pletion?'
Although this clause does not deal directly with the problem at
hand, it does contain some language that needs interpretation in this
regard. For instance, it says in paragraph (a), above, that the Gov-
ernment shall pay the fixed fee "for the performance of this contract."
It also says, in paragraph (e), that the withheld portion of the fee will
be paid upon submission of an invoice promptly following completion
of the work under the contract. There is the implication that such an
invoice would be submitted when the funds ran out as well as when
the work was physically completed, since this is the only means pro-
vided by the contract language to close out the contract. Thus, this
language can be interpreted as saying that the fixed fee will be paid
when the contract is completed or performed. The language does not,
however, provide satisfactory guidance on what will constitute comple-
tion or performance.
In spite of the lack of specific language covering this question in
cost plus fixed fee contracts, as a matter of actual practice, the Con-
tracting Officer usually asks for and receives a reduction of fee at the
time the funds run out before the work has been completed. This
procedure is based on the opinion of the Government that the situa-
tion is governed by the provisions of the "Termination" clause. Since
the work had not been completed, the Government would have the
right to terminate the contract at its convenience. Thus, the negotiation
of a reduction of fee is merely a method of simplifying the termina-
tion procedure.
Is this, however, a proper interpretation of the "Termination"
clause? That clause provides:
(a) The performance of work under the contract may be
terminated by the Government in accordance with this clause
in whole, or from time to time in part:
(2) Whenever for any reason the Contracting Officer
24 Ibid.
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shall determine that such termination is in the best in-
terest of the Government.
Any such termination shall be effected by delivery to the
Contractor of a Notice of Termination specifying whether
termination is for the default of the Contractor or for the
convenience of the Government, the extent to which per-
formance of work under the contract is terminated, and the
date upon which such termination becomes effective.'
This clause contemplates action by the Contracting Officer during
the performance of the contract, not after the Contractor has com-
pleted performance. The whole tenor of the clause is in terms of adtions
of the parties when work is stopped during performance. In the case
of a Contractor who reaches the cost estimate and has not completed
the work, however, the "Limitation of Cost" clause contains its own
provisions relating to the action of the parties. Thus, the clause spe-
cifically relieves the Contractor of any obligation to continue the work
after the funds have been exhausted. The issuance of a notice of ter-
mination for the covenience of the Government, after the Contractor
has stopped work pursuant to the terms of another clause of the con-
tract, would be a meaningless act.
It can thus be argued that the two clauses are mutually exclusive
in this area, for they provide alternate procedures, with the "Limita-
tion of Cost" clause clearly taking priority at the time the Contractor
reaches the estimated cost of the contract. This point was well and
succinctly made in the case of General Electronic Labs., Inc.' The
issue in that case was whether compensation under a terminated cost-
reimbursement type contract was limited to the contract's estimated
cost, where the Contractor elected to settle a termination claim on the
inventory basis and where the Government demanded delivery of the
inventory. The cost of the inventory resulted in an overrun of the cost
estimate.
In finding for the appellant the Board said:
Upon all the evidence, we conclude that the Government
intended to demand and acquire the fruits of all of ap-
pellant's work and intended to pay for it, and chose the ter-
mination route to effectuate this intent. The Government
argues that the Limitation of Cost clause is a contractual
impediment to such effectuation. The short answer to this
argument is that we find the Government's intent, as ex-
pressed through the Termination Contracting Officer, acting
by direction of the cognizant technical personnel, included
25 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. 7.203-10 (1959) referring to ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 8.702 (1959).
26 ASBCA No. 8097, 1963 BCA 3921 (1963).
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either abrogation of the Limitation of Cost clause, or in-
vocation of the last sentence thereof. Nor is a specific finding
of such intent necessary. •
The Limitation of Cost Clause is, by its terms, applic-
able to the cost 'for the performance' of a contract. All
of its provisions point to a procedure looking toward active
performance and continuance of a contract, rather than ter-
minating work. Compliance with its provisions becomes im-
possible once a termination notice has been issued. For ex-
ample, how can a contractor notify the Government that
costs to be incurred in PERFORMING the contract will
exceed 85% of the cost estimate in the ensuing 30 days of
termination procedures? We conclude that this clause has
no application to, nor effect upon the Termination clause
and its consequent procedures.
The Termination clause in cost-reimbursement type con-
tracts contains no delimiting language regarding total pay-
ments. Compare this with the clause for fixed-price contracts
which limits the total settlement to the contract price. ASPR
8-701 (a), Subclause (e). We regard this difference as sig-
nificant, and probably inherent in the philosophy underlying
cost-reimbursement type contracts."
To what fee is the Contractor entitled if the Government does
not provide the additional funds necessary to complete the work? In
one case before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, the
Contractor was held to be entitled to the full fee called for by the
contract. In this case, American Hydromath Corp., 28 the Contractor
stopped work when the funds ran out, and the Contracting Officer
decided not to provide additional funds. The Contracting Officer then
refused to pay the withheld portion of the fee (which was 20% of the
total fee) on the ground that there had been no satisfactory comple-
tion of the contract. The contract contained the following language
governing the payment of the fee: "A final payment ... of the fixed
fee shall be made to the contractor upon the satisfactory completion
of this contract." The Board noted the distinction between completion
of the work under the contract and completion of the contract itself.
In the instant case it was found that there was no further obligation
on the part of the Contractor (in accordance with the contract lan-
guage, which was substantially the same as the terms of the "Limita-
tion of Cost" clause), and that the work which had been done had
been accepted as satisfactory by the Government. The Board there-
27 Ibid.
28 ASBCA No. 3127, 56-2 BCA 1149 (1956).
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fore felt that the Contractor had met the contract requirement of
"satisfactory completion of the contract" and was entitled to the full
fee. It might be noted that the Board pointed out that the Government
was free to draft contract language requiring pro-rata fee adjustments,
but that the language in the contract in question would not be so
interpreted.
In the only other case bearing on this issue, the opposite result
was reached. In that case, Sterling Precision Corp., 2° when the funds
ran out, the Contracting Officer took a different course of action than
had his counterpart in American Hydromath. In the Sterling case the
contract was terminated for default. This, of course, resulted in no
fee being paid to the Contractor. The Board found that the Contractor
had been behind schedule at the time the funds ran out, but that he
was making progress, and that the proximate cause of his failure to
complete the work was the failure of the Government to provide ad-
ditional funds in the contract. Thus, the Board found, generally, that
the provisions of the "Limitation of Cost" clause will excuse a Con-
tractor from performance under the provisions of the "Excusable
Delays" clause of the contract. The Board converted the termination
to a termination for the convenience of the Government, in accordance
with the generally accepted interpretation of paragraph (a) of the
"Termination" clause." The Contractor was therefore awarded a per-
centage of the contract fee equivalent to the percentage of completion
of the work under the contract, as called for by the "Termination"
clause in the case of convenience terminations. The Board did not
consider whether the Contracting Officer had the right to issue any
type of termination after the funds had run out. Evidently this question
was not raised by the parties. On its face, however, Sterling would
indicate that the Contracting Officer has such a right.
On the surface, these two cases would seem to indicate that the
determination of fee in such a situation is based on the action which
29
 ASBCA No. 4646, 59-2 BCA ¶ 2371 (1959).
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 The clause contains the following language in the last sentence of paragraph (a):
If, after notice of termination of this contract for default under (i) above, it
is determined that the Contractor's failure to perform or to make progress
in performance is due to causes beyond the control and without the fault or
negligence of the Contractor pursuant to the provisions of the clause of this
contract relating to excusable delays, the Notice of Termination shall be deemed
to have been issued under (ii) above, and the rights and obligations of the
parties hereto shall in such event be governed accordingly.
In the Sterling case, the Board relied on this language, although there was actually
no default by either failure to perform or failure to make progress and thus the
termination could not be converted to a termination for the convenience of the Govern-
ment in accordance with this language. See Klein v. United States, 152 Ct. Cl. 221,
285 F.2d 778 (1961), where the Court of Claims held that the Government could
not convert a default termination to a convenience termination under similar circum-
stances.
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the Contracting Officer takes at the time the funds run out. If he with-
holds the remaining fee, the Contractor may recover the full fee; but if
he issues a termination notice, the Contractor may only recover a por-
tion of the fee. Such an interpretation, however, would not make sense,
since the rights of the parties should not be so sensitive to change by
their procedural actions after the Contractor's substantive obligations
have ended. It is therefore proposed that the interpretation in the
American Hydromath case is the more sound, and the one which should
be followed whether or not a termination notice is issued after the
funds run out.
This raises the question of whether it would be inequitable for
the Contractor to get the full fee when he had not performed the entire
job called for by the contract sr This, of course, depends on the bargain
which the parties have made. In the case of a term-type contract,
where the parties explicitly bargain for a certain amount of engineering
time rather than the completion of a task, the fee is clearly earned when
the time has been expended. What is the bargain in a contract calling
for the completion of a task of work? It can be argued that it is one
in which the Contractor undertakes at the option of the Government
to: (a) perform all of the work within the delivery schedule, so long
as the Government provides the necessary funds; or (b) perform in a
satisfactory manner the work which is possible until the funds run out.
This interpretation is borne out by the language of the "Limitation of
Cost" clause, which gives the Government the alternative rights of
increasing the estimated cost of the contract or of not increasing the
estimated cost, but which nowhere gives the Government the right to
reduce the fee of the Contractor in the event it chooses riot to increase
the estimated cost.
If, then, this is the proper interpretation of the bargain which
the parties have made, the Contractor has completely fulfilled his
obligations under the contract when the funds run out and the Govern-
ment elects to provide no additional money. In such case, he is entitled
to the full fee. The final argument in favor of this interpretation is
that the contract is drafted by the Government and therefore is con-
strued against the Government when ambiguities occur. In this case,
the language is clearly ambiguous at best and therefore should be
31
 See Navy Contract Law, 8.36, where it is indicated that the Government
must be satisfied that the Contractor has "earned" the fee before it can be paid. This
section further points out that "nothing short of the completion of the task will satisfy
the performance requirements and earn the full amount of the fee" in a contract calling
for a task to be completed. It is interesting to note that this section also contains the
following sentence: "Since the Limitation of Cost clause is silent on the matter of fee,
it may be well to have the fee provisions specifically call for an equitable adjustment
under such circumstances." The circumstances referred to occur when the Contracting
Officer decides not to fund an impending overrun.
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construed in favor of the Contractor. This is certainly true on these
facts, where it would be very simple for the Government to draft
these "boilerplate" clauses to state clearly that the fee would be re-
duced, in the event the Government elects not to provide additional
funds and the work is not completed.
TITLE TO PROPERTY
As we have seen, it frequently happens that in addition to having
expended all Government funds allotted to the contract, a Contractor
will have spent some of his own money. Where the cost overrun is not
recoverable, the question of what is to be done with equipment pro-
duced with combined funds still remains.
This treatment of the problem should be prefaced by a quote
from Republic Aviation Corp.: 32
With respect to this claimed right of the Government
to take the termination inventory and then not pay all of the
incurred performance costs, the following colloquy took place
between the hearing member and counsel for the Government.
"Lt. Col. Hand: . . . but is the Government entitled to
take what the contractor obtained with these reimburs-
able costs? That's my question.
"Mr. Smolka: The contractor was simply continuing
his performance under the contract which he had a right
to do, and as and to the extent that the contractor per-
formed, the Government was, under the contract, en-
titled to accept the benefit of this performance.
"Lt. Col. Hand: You mean the Government is entitled
to accept the benefits even though the benefits are tend-
ered and made possible because of overrun costs?
"Mr. Smolka: Yes, sir.
"Lt. Col. Hand: That is your position?
"Mr. Smolka: Yes, sir."
And at another time:
"Lt. Col. Hand: You mean you are going to keep the
airplanes and not pay for them?"
Government counsel replied that the consideration flowing to the
Contractor under a CPFE contract is the money he receives under
the cost method plus his fee. If the Government is unwilling to increase
the estimated cost, he has a right to discontinue performance where
32
 Republic Aviation Corp., supra note 17.
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the estimated cost has been reached. The consideration in effect is
stated in the contract and the Contractor is not to exceed the estimated
cost except at his own risk.
The Government counsel said since this was the bargain, and since
the contractor had been paid according to this bargain, the fact that
the contractor would not receive a direct recoupment for his later pro-
duction would still not lead to the conclusion that the Government was
not paying him for his performance.
As stated earlier in this paper, the Republic Aviation decision
was in fact based upon different grounds, but this question remains.
Can the Government accept the benefits of performance and not pay
for them even though it never induced the Contractor to continue
performance after exhaustion of funds?
The Board, in Republic, said:
This finding that appellant had in fact been adequately
notified under the Payment's Article that the funds on the
contract had been increased eliminates the necessity of our
making any determination concerning the legal effect of the
Government taking all of the termination inventory, even
though at least part of the termination inventory had been
created by the alleged overrun costs. In passing this point we
note, however, that this action of the T.C.O. was consistent
with an adequately funded contract and the argument of the
appellant that the Government's right to the termination
inventory was limited by the language in the Termination
Article to that portion of the inventory "for the costs of which
the contractor has been or will be reimbursed under this
contract." (Emphasis supplied.)
This language indicates that if there is a termination for con-
venience of the Government, and if the Government wants the termi-
nation inventory, the Contractor will be entitled to reimbursement
of overrun costs expended in producing this equipment.
It is conceivable that the Government will not want the equip-
ment and that the Contractor will therefore have built it for his own
account. It commonly happens that an equipment is started with funds
allotted to the contract and completed with overrun funds. This occurs
particularly in contracts for few but expensive equipments. The prob-
lem is compounded when considerable labor and materials have
been poured into the production of this end item and each party has
contributed funds.
If termination is not proper when contract funds are exhausted,
we no longer have the benefit of the "Termination" clause referred
to in the Republic case to aid in determining who will bear the cost
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of the equipment built with both Government and Contractor's funds.
Resort to the "Limitation of Cost" clause in this situation does not
tell us anything about the title situation on an equipment in which
mixed monies are invested. The "Limitation of Cost" clause is little
more than a device to control expenditure of Government money in
cost reimbursement contracts.
Although the "Limitation of Cost" clause, which provides the
necessary control is quite reasonable, nonetheless a contracting party
should not be permitted to reap benefits for which he is not required
to pay. The clause was not intended to achieve this result. If the
Government takes equipment constructed wholly or partially with
overrun funds, it should be compelled to reimburse the Contractor for
his allowable costs.
Contractual support for this proposition is found in the "Govern-
ment Property" clause, in which there appears the following sentence:
Title to all property purchased by the contractor for
the cost of which the contractor is entitled to be reimbursed
as a direct item of cost under this contract, shall pass to and
vest in the Government upon delivery of such property by the
vendor.
This language is similar to the language of the "Termination"
article, quoted by Lt. Col. Hand in the Republic Aviation decision.
Under the "Government Property" clause, then, the Government's
right to take property produced under the contract is limited to the
property for the cost of which the Contractor is entitled to be reim-
bursed. When the Government takes possession (and hence title),
it is required to reimburse the Contractor for costs he has invested
in the equipment, be they contract or overrun funds. This result
does not do violence to any equitable or contractual principles.
In keeping with the equitable and contractual principles which
do and should govern contracts between the citizen and his Govern-
ment, it is here proposed that when the Government, with knowledge
of the existence of an overrun situation, permits the Contractor to
continue performance, it should be required to pay for this performance,
whether or not it wishes to accept the equipment.
This situation resembles an acceptance by silence," wherein one
party, with reasonable opportunity to reject offered services, takes
the benefit of them under circumstances which would indicate to a
reasonable man that they were offered with the expectation of com-
pensation. Failure to seasonably decline the proffered services in these
cases is an acceptance.
88 Restatement, Contracts, § 72 (1932).
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Remember, too, that the Government is an active participant
in contract performance. It is in constant contact with its Contractors
by virtue of a host of administrative requirements and through the
presence of Government inspectors at the Contractor's plant.
In conclusion of this part, and by way of summation, Contractors
who pour overrun funds into a product should be reimbursed, when
the Government, with or without original knowledge of the overrun,
takes equipment produced with the Contractor's own money; or when
the Government, with original knowledge of the overrun, does not
wish to accept the equipment, but silently stands by and permits the
Contractor to spend his own money completing it, knowing full well
that the Contractor was not expecting to work gratuitously.
COST CEILING CLAUSES
The General Electric case referred to earlier," provides a frame-
work for the consideration of cost ceilings. The cost plus fixed fee
contract involved in that case was in a "maximum amount" which the
Contracting Officer could increase at his option. Failing such increase,
the Contractor was not obliged to continue performance.
The Board held that certain contract language established sim-
ilar "maximums" for each intra-company order. The intra-company
order in question had a maximum amount of $199,850, which was
increased by the Contracting Officer's letter to a maximum of $238,850.
The Board concluded that General Electric had a right to stop work
at the $238,850 expenditure point and the appeal for the recovery of
the overrun of costs beyond this amount was denied.
The first problem is one of definition. Is a "maximum" which
can be increased at the option of the Contracting Officer and beyond
which the Contractor may discontinue performance a "ceiling"? The
Board begins its decision by pointing out that attorneys for both
parties agreed that the prime issue in the case was whether the intra-
company order contained a ceiling limitation on expenditures. In the
writer's opinion, the "ceiling" concept is badly handled in the above
decision. A ceiling on costs, to be distinguished from a limit on costs,
should be confined to an agreement by which the Contractor agrees
to complete an undertaking for which he is to be paid no more than
the ceiling amount.
Using this definition, then, the maximum cost clauses in General
Electric's contract are not ceilings on costs but limits on costs. In
fact, the Contracting Officer in a letter did increase the limit on the
purchase order. If the order had contained a ceiling, the Contracting
Officer would have had no right to increase the dollars, on the principle
34 General Elec Co supra note 11.
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that the Government was receiving no consideration for the increase,
being already entitled to complete performance.
In the letter increasing the limit the Contracting Officer said:
This approval is granted on the condition that there be in-
corporated into Purchase Order NPD-3082 a provision to
the effect that notwithstanding any provision to the contrary
all existing requirements thereunder will be completed at
cost, as defined in the contract, plus the fixed fee. This results
in a total estimated cost for Purchase Order NPD-3082
of $239,850 including a fixed fee of $10,290. (Emphasis
supplied.)"
If this language, which calls for completed work at a cost no
greater than $238,850 imposes a ceiling, as it seems to do, then the
Board is not correct in saying that General Electric had an option to
discontinue the work when it had incurred costs in the ceiling amount.
By agreeing to the Contracting Officer's letter (through words or
conduct) the Contractor has agreed to complete the work, no matter
what the cost to him.
CEILINGS ON COST ELEMENTS
For many years, it was quite customary for the parties to a
Government cost-type contract to include in the contract a prede-
termined fixed overhead rate in the form of a percentage of direct
labor costs for an agreed period. In 1956 the Comptroller General
held that these predetermined fixed rates were illegal, as a violation
of the prohibition against cost plus a percentage of cost system of con-
tracting.
Cost sharing arrangements in which the Government's obligation
to pay any cost is fixed by the contract at less than actual costs are
neither illegal nor unknown. Thus, a contract may impose ceilings on
any cost element, whether direct or indirect.
One of the main reasons for the existence of the fixed prede-
termined overhead rate was that it gave the Contractor knowledge in
advance of the exact rate at which he would be reimbursed. Today,
the use of provisional rates which are adjusted post-audit to actual
costs, leaves the Contractor in a position where he does not always
know the rate at which he is incurring overhead costs. Yet the "Limi-
tation of Cost" article requires that he provide the Contracting Officer
with notice at the 85% point."
35 Ibid.
36 PRD Electronics, Inc., supra note 7.
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THE BUSINESS PROBLEM
In conclusion, no paper on the subject of cost limits can be com-
plete without some mention of the serious business problems which
arise from these clauses. It is a simple matter for an attorney to advise
a client to stop work when the money is expended. It is not, however,
such a simple decision for the businessman. If he has a large work
force on hand, this alternative may not be a realistic one. It is under-
standable that in this situation the businessman will not infrequently
rely on the good faith efforts of the Contracting Officer to obtain retro-
active funding. On the other hand, all too many businessmen are care-
less of the notice requirement in the limitation clauses. It is the duty of
the business manager to send a timely notice, and to keep the Con-
tracting Officer advised of expenditures beyond the limit. Government
personnel resent the "surprise overrun," and well they should.
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